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The classical inconsistency between increasing returns and perfect competition is addressed.
For example, if firms must pay a fixed cost of entry but then can produce using a constant
returns to scale technology, they will generally operate at a loss, necessitating a
government subsidy in order to attain an efficient allocation. Rere we show that perfect
competition and increasing returns can be consistent, in the sense that equilibria exist and
are ef5cient without government intervention, provided that units of some input such as
land can be identified and priced separately. The Alonso model with a finite number of
agents is extended to include production under increasing returns, where all agents are
mobile. The key is that producers use intervals of land, and the price they pay for land
interior to the parcels can be adjusted to provide an implicit subsidy. Input price
discrimination extends the sway of the free market to monopoly and monopsony. The
relevance to the recent minimum wage debate is discussed.
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I. Introduction
Our goal is to reconcile the notions of increasing returns and perfect competition.
We demonstrate in our model that equilibria can exist and can be efficient without
government intervention. Land plays a key role in this analysis.
It is well-known that increasing returns (say a fixed cost followed by constant
returns to scale production) and perfect competition are not compatible, since at an
equilibrium, the first order condition for profit maximization - price equals marginal
cost - implies negative profits. Although substantial progress has been made using
models in which price is set at marginal cost but firms are subsidized, or multipart
tariffs are employed, problems still remain; see Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) [as well
as other papers in the symposium issueJ, Bonanno (1990) or Vassilakis (1989, 1993) for
discussion. i
Our initial goal was to prove a second welfare theorem. Here transfers have
generally been employed in the literature. They can obviously mitigate the problem of
negative profits ïor producers by simply providing a subsidy to producers who are
operating at a Pareto optimum but who would otherwise make a loss at supporting
prices. The idea that firms yielding increasing returns to scale should be subsidized in
order to obtain an efficíent allocation goes back at least to Marshall (1953, Book V,
Chapter XIII), the Grst edition of which was published in 1890. A precursor can be
found in Whitaker (1975, pp. 88-89, pp. 228-230), who published writings of Marshall
dating from the 1870's. Pigou (1962, Part II, Chapter XI), 5rst published in 1920,
touches on this subject in passing. Pigou (1927, p. 197) is particularly explicit:2
1For instance, marginal cost pricing relates only to the first order conditions for
optimization for the firms, so at a marginal cost pricing equilibrium, a firm may not
be maximizing profits. Further, a marginal cost pricing or multipart tariff equilibrium
allocation is not necessarily Pareto optimal. (Marginal cost pricing reílects the first
order conditions for Pareto efficiency, but the second order conditions might not hold.)
zPigou (1927) is part of a far-ranging discussion about "Empty Boxes" in the Economic
Journal addressing this topic; see in particirlar Robertson (1924, p. 22).2
In order to maximize satisfaction - inequalities of wealth
among different people and so on being ignored - it is
necessary, except in the special case where satisfaction is
maximised by a níl output, for that quantity of output
to be produced which makes demand price equal to
marginal costs, í.e. which corresponds to the point of
intersection of the demand curve and the curve of
marginal costs. [...] Output, however, tends to be
carried to the point in respect of which the demand
curve intersects with the supply curve. [...] But in
conditions of decreasing costs, where the supply curve
coincides with the curve of average costs, it will not be
the right point. Unless the State intervenes by a
bounty or in some other way, output will be carried less
far than it is socially desirable that it should be carried.
Others involved in this discussion are Clapham (1922), Pigou (1922), Sraffa (1926),
Shove (1928), Pigou (192E), Robbins (1928), Schumpeter (1928), Young (1928),
Robertson (1930), Sraffa (1930), and Shove (1930). It is important to note that the
work of Marshall and Pigou confused scale economies with externalities internal to an
industry but external to each firm, and consequently they recommended a misplaced
Pigouvian remedy for scale economies. Our reconciliation of increasing returns and
perfect competition is direct and invokes no externality argument.
The use of transfers would be an easy way out of the conflict between increasing
returns and a perfectly competitive equilibrium by essentially assuming the conflict
away. Instead, we focus on existence of a competitive equilibrium and the first welfare
theorem. The latter is proved using standard techniques.
This research has applications to the theory of agglomeration and city formation.
Increasing returns is otten used as an agglomerative force in models seeking to explain
how, where, and why cities form. For example, Fupta (1988), Fupta and Krugman
(1993, 1995), and Krugman (1991, 1993a, 1993b) use a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) framework
and increasing returns to generate city formation in a monopolistic competition context.
Since our model will employ increasing returns in a spatial context, it offers the
prospect of addressing questions and generating testable hypotheses about cities. This3
is discussed further in the conclusion.
In what follows, we stick as closely as possible to the perfectly competitive ideal,
since it is simplest to analyze, it is a very standard and convenient benchmark, it
allows us to develop proofs of existence of equilibrium (perhaps useful in the imperfect
competition context) without having to worry about other distractions, it may be a
good approximation to reality in large economies, and it will tell us when the welfare
theorems are likely to hold and why. Moreover, it enables us to separate problems due
to the spatial context from those attributable to imperfect competition. Notice that
models of marginal cost pricing, multipart tariffs, and subsidization of firms under
increasing returns all employ close relatives of perfect competition.
Of course, one can take a more positive approach to the problem of increasing
returns if perfect competition is deemed unreasonable in such environments, and simply
employ imperfect competition models. However, such models usually use rather special
assumptions about game forms (e.g., Cournot or Bertrand competition), as in the
literature we have already cited. Moreover, equilibrium allocations generated by these
models are generally not first best. Monopsony and minimum wages are discussed in
the conclusion.
We investigate whether a government ought to intervene in markets for
commodities subject to increasing returns in production. A spatial model with finite
numbers of producers and consumers (rather than a continuum) is examined both
because in the arguments we use, agents employ intervals rather than densities of
land3, and for several other reasons. Berliant (1985) shows that the usual
approximation of continuum economies by finite economies dces not work when land
plays a role in the models, so demand and equilibria of the continuum models may not
3We mean that agents own land parcels represented by sets of positive Lebesgue
measure in a Euclidean space (!R) rather than owning land parcels represented by a
quantity at a point. The latter is more common in urban economics, and is usually
called a density.4
be close to those of any interesting 5nite model. It is then reasonable to ask if the
continuum models make any sense. Examples in Berliant and ten Raa (1991) show
that equilibrium can fail to exist in the monocentric city model under standard
assumptions on preferences. Examples in Berliant, Papageorgiou and Wang (1990) show
that the welfare theorems can fail in the monocentric city model. Berliant and Wang
(1993) show that even utilitarian soáal optima might fail to exist in continuum models
with land. The ímplication of these examples is that the use of a continuum of
consumers solves some of the problems associated with the indivisibility of location, but
creates others.
The key to the analysis is provided by Berliant and Fupta (1992), who show that
for Alonso's urban economic model, a model of pure exchange on the real line where
agents are required to own intervals that represent land parcels, there is generally a
continuum of equilibria under perfect competition. Infra-marginal land (that is, land
not at the endpoints of an interval owned by an agent) is not priced uniquely, thus
allowing a kind oí indeterminacy in the expenditure of agents on land. It is this kind
of indeterminacy that we exploit below to effect implicit transfers to producers (by
keeping the infra-marginal price of land low) who would otherwise have negative
profits.
Section II presents the notation and model, section III details a general version of
the first welfare theorem, and section IV introduces a model with one producer and one
consumer, solving for two different classes of equilibria. Section V shows how these
equilibria can be extended to a model with two producers and multiple consumers,
while section VI concludes. An appendix contains all of the proofs.5
II. The Model
We introduce production into Alonso's (1964) model of pure exchange. The model
of pure exchange was developed further by Asami (1988), Asami, Fujita and Smith
(1991), Berliant (1991), and Berliant and Fujita (1992).
Consider a long narrow city represented on the real line. Land is given by X-
[0,!), where l is the length of the city. The density of land available is 1 at each
point x E X.
There are i- 1,...,I consumers and j- 1,...,J producers. Each consumer has an
endowment of 1 unit of labor, which will be supplied inelastically. Labor is not
necessarily homogeneous, so labor income can differ among consumers. This can be
seen as skill or time endowment diíferences. Consumers all have the same preferences,
and will get utility from a composite consumption good and land. Thus, u: IR} -. IR.
Consumers are not endowed with composite good or land. Composite good is produced,
while an absentee landlord is endowed with land. We write u(c,s), where c is the
quantity of consumption good and s is the quantity of land consumed; the latter is
equal to the length of the interval owned by the consumer. For consumer i, ci is
composite good consumption, si is land consumption, wi is wage rate, and [ai,ai-Fsi) C
X is the parcel of land owned by i. Define w-[w1,...,wl].
Notice that w is assumed to be independent of the location of labor. This is an
assumption of períect competition, that each agent takes prices as given independent of
their own actions and the actions of other agents, particularly firms' locations.
Without such an assumption, equilibrium allocations are not likely to be Pareto
optimal. Since our purpose is to reconcile increasing returns with perfect competition,
we must take prices as parametric. Of course, for other purposes, imperfect
competition is a more suitable premise. If wages are allowed to vary with location in
the context of perfect competition, then the constant wage gradient equilibrium that we
study here naturally becomes a special case. Consumers have no intrinsic preference for6
location.
Composite consumption good, assumed to be freely mobile, is taken to be
numeraire. The price of land is denoted by an integrable function p: X ti IR. The
a.fs.
price of consumer i's parcel is f~ ~ p(x) dm(x). Throughout, m is the Lebesgue
a.i
measure on the real line. Since we shall be dealing with examples rather than
functional analytic techniques, we shall be quite explicit about what p is, so there is no
reason to be very technical about function spaces.
Since the labor market is competitive and consumers pay their own commuting
cost, consumers will be employed by the closest producer. Let producer j use land
parcel (bj,bjfaj) C X. Then commuting distance to the closest producer ís given by
d(ai,si) - min inf {IIx-YII I x E[ai,aifsi), y E[bj,bj~Qj)},4 the closest point distance
J
between consumer i and the nearest employer. In Section IV, commuting cost for
consumer i is given by t.d(ai,si), where t~ 0. This is the example used by Alonso
(1964) and Berl;ant and Fujita (1992); it incorporates a constant marginal cost of
transport per unit distance, to the closest firm. Notice that commuting cost depends
on both the consumer location and the location of the nearest employer.
In general, commuting cost for agent i is taken to be a function Ti:X2If2JyIR}.
We write Ti(al'sl'"''aI'sI'bl'~1'"''bJ'~J)~
Thus, commuting cost for consumer i can,
but does not necessarily, depend on the actions of all agents in the model. For
notational simplicity, define A-[a1,s1,...,al,sl] and B-[bl'al'" 'bJ'~J]' and write
Ti(p B).s
40í course, d depends on the parcels and locations chosen by every producer in addition
to ai and si, but to keep notation simple, we suppress these additional arguments.
s0ur framework allows us to examine more general commuting cost functions. For
instance, another example that we have studied involves a fixed cost for road
construction. Each agent takes a cost-minimizing route to work, but incurs fixed costs
(per unit distance) for road construction between their parcel and the next consumer on
the route to their job. The next consumer pays the cost for connecting to the next7
Notice that the Alonso commuting cost function is a special case that is attained
by setting Ti(A,B) - t.d(ai,si). Moreover, the fact that Ti can depend on the
allocation of land to every agent creates an externality, in that the choice of land
parcel by an agent can aífect the budget constraint of others. What is fascinating
about this observation is that, as we shall see in the next section, this externality does
not create a market failure.
Consumer i's optimization problem is
a.fs.
(1) max u(ci,si) subject to ci f f ~' p(x) dm(x) -F Ti(A,B) ( wi
ai, s i, ci ai
Producers use land and labor to produce composite good. All producers have the
same production [unction g: Ut}}I ~ IR. Let producer j use land parcel (bj,bjtoj) C X.
The vector qj E{0,1}I contains a 1 in position i if consumer i works at firm j, and a
0 otherwise. We write zj - g(oj,qj). The proiit optimization problem of firm j is:
b.fo.
(2) ~- max g(oj,qj) - f ~ ~ p(x) dm(x) - qj.w.
bj,oj,qj b,
DeGne rr - [x1,...,xJ].
Since land and labor are difíerentiated and indivisible commodities, it is not clear
what "increasing returns to scale" means. One might argue that since land has a fixed
density but can be priced differently at diíferent locations, land input should be
modeled as an interval rather than just the size of an interval. If so, it would be
impossible to alter the use of any input without jumping to another commodity;
quantities would be zero or one. We have assumed, implicitly, that only the size of an
interval matters in production. In the equilibrium existence analysis (sections IV and
V) we shall also assume that only the total amount of labor input, the sum of the
closest agent, and so forth. The intuitive interpretation is that the road through the
next consumer's parcel is already built. Total commuting cost will be the sum of the
marginal commuting costs along the entire route.8
components of vector qj, matters. Thus, output is a function oí land and labor where
both inputs are represented by scalars and, therefore, returns to scale can be defined as
usual.
Following Alonso (1964) and the new urban economics literature, an absentee
landlord is endowed with all of the land, but gets utility only írom composite good.
For simplicity, we also endow the absentee landlord with all oí the shares in all of the
5rms.6 In equilibrium, the absentee landlord collects all oí the land rent. Taking p( .)
! J
and ~r as given, the landlord consumes f p(x) dm(x) f E ~r.. The composite good
O j-1 J
consumption of the landlord will be denoted by cL.
Notice that, as in the Alonso model, preferences and production are ]ocation
independent.
We continue with the analogs oí standard definitions for this model. An allocatian
is a list [{ci,s;,ai}i I 1,cL,{zj,bj,oj,qj}jJ 1], where for every i- 1,...,I and j- 1,...,J,
ci,zj,cL E IR}, si,ai,bj,oj E X, qj E{0,1}I. An allocation
[{ci,si,ai}; I 1,cL,{zj,bj,oj,qj}jJ 1] is called jeasible ifr
I J
(s) E[; t T;(A,B)] f ~L ~ E Z
;-1 j-1 j
(4) zj - g(oj,qj) for j - 1,...,J
J
(5) E q - [1,...,1]
j-1 ~
(6) {[ai,ai-fs~)}iIl,{[bj,bj~oj)}j~l form a partition of X.
A feasible allocation [{c;,s;,a;}i I 1,cL,{zj,bj,oj,qj} jJ 1] is called Pareto Optimal if
6It seems clear that one could allow consumer ownership of stock in the firms without
altering the results much, but at the cost oí complicating the arguments and notation.
ICondition (5) requires that all people work. Strictly speaking, this is not necessary.
However, since we will assume that there is no disutility oí work and utility is
increasing in consumption, (5) will hold in equilibrium. Also, condition (6) requires
that all land is used. This will hold in equilibrium since we will assume that utility is
increasing in land consumption.9
there is no other feasible allocation [{c~,s~,a~}iII,cL,{z~,b~,o~,q~}jJl] such that cL )
cL and for each i- 1,...,I u(c~,s~) ) u(ci,si), with a strict inequality holding for at
least one of these relations.
A competitive equiliórsum consists of a feasible allocation
[{ci,si,ai}i I 1,cL,{zj,bj,oj,qj}jJ I], an integrable land price function p: X-~ ~t, a vector of
profits ~r E ~tJ and a vector oí wages w E OtI (the freely mobile composite consumption
commodity is taken to be numeraire), such that
(7) cL - f 1P(x) dm(x) f,E ~
0 ~-1
(S) {ci,si,ai} solves (1) for i - 1,...,I.
(9) {aj,zj,bj,~j,qj} solves (2), for j - 1,...,J.
The allocation component of a competitive equilibrium is called an equilibrium
aUocation.
Notice that agents take into account the total supply of land when solving their
optimization problems. This constriction of the commodity space is essential to our
results, and appears in the spatial economic literature more generally.
III. The First Welfare Theorem
This will be proved for a very general version of the model in the standard way,
for example as in Berliant and Fujita (1992, Proposition 2). The most interesting
aspect of this result is that, in spite of the externality present in the commuting cost
function of consumers, equilibrium allocations are first best, so there is no market
failure.
We say that the utility function u(c,s) is increasing in consumption good if for all
c ~ 0, s ~ 0, for all c' ~ c, u(c',s) ~ u(c,s).
Define u s inf {u(c,s) ~(c,s) E Q2}}. We say that land is a necessity when s- 010
implies u(c,s) - u.
Theorem 1: If u is increasing in consumption good and land is a necessity, then any
equilibríum allocation such that each consumer's utility is greater than u is Pareto
optimal.
Proof: See Appendix.
Theorem 18 holds even when the utility functions ui(ci,si,ai) differ by consumer
and are location dependent (provided they satisfy analogs of the assumptions), and
when the production functions gj(qj,aj,bj) differ by producer and are location dependent.
IV. Existence of Equilibrium with One Producer and One Consumer
As described in Berliant and Fujita (1992), demand (and in the present model,
supply) correspondences are not convex-valued. In fact, the contract curve in the pure
BThe assumption oí monotonicity in consumption good requires as a hypothesis that
consumer land consumption be non~ero; the purpose is to include examples such as
Cobb-Douglas utilities, which would not satisíy the assumption if it were imposed
where land consumption is zero. Usually, local non-satiation is used in place of a
monotonicity assumption. Local non-satiation would be sufficient here if the
commuting cost function were upper semicontinuous. Unfortunately, we must employ a
commuting cost function that is not upper semicontinuous in section V below, so we
weaken the assumption on the commuting cost function and strengthen the assumption
on utility. Finally, with commuting cost dropping discontinuously when parcel size
tends to zero, it is possible to have equilibria where some consumer owns no land. If
such a consumer owns some consumption good, then the equilibrium allocation might
not be Pareto optimal, for example with Cobb-Douglas utility, since the consumer gets
no utility írom the consumption good, and a transfer to the absentee landlord would
result in a Pareto improvement. Thus, the assumption that utility exceeds its infimum
is necessary. Hence, for the purposes of this Theorem, we assume that land is a
necessity and that utility exceeds its infimum at an equilíbrium allocation. The
implication is that land consumption is positive and hence the monotonicity assumption
can be applied. Every equilibrium that we shall construct has positive land
consumption and utility exceeding its infimum.11
exchange model is disconnected; see 5gure 2 of that paper. Due to the discreteness
and nonconvexities inherent in the model, we prove that an equilibrium exists by
actually finding one. In fact, for the simple case examined in this section, we find two
classes of equilibria.
In this section we examine the following set of examples. Let I - 1 and J- 1,
and for notational simplicity, drop the subscripts referring to agents. An equilibrium
will belong to one oí two classes, I or II, depending on its characteristics. Equilibria
not in either class exist as well.
Definition: We say that the ficnctional form restrictions jor classes I artd II hold
when utility, production, and commuting cost satisfy the following conditions: u(c,s) -
c f a-ln(s) (a ~ 0), g(a,q) - Q.min (o,q) - í, where í is a Gxed cost in terms of
composite good, and Ti(A,B) - t-d(ai,si}; we use the Alonsu CUIllnlLLting cust in Lllis
section.
Next, let us give bounds on exogenous parameters for class I.
DeSnition: We say that the parameter restrictions jor class I hold when the
following conditions are met: l ~ 2.87, f~ a.{1~(I-z) - In((~1)~(!-2)]},
p~ a~(t-z) t a.[z.ln((~1)I({~~z}-I)) - ln((t-1)I(~z))].
It is easy to see that the bounds on f and p are positive. In essence, what is
needed is that total land l) 2.87, fixed cost f is small relative to the marginal utility
of land ( a), and returns to scale (p) are large relative to a. Clearly, these restrictions
represent a set of parameters with nonempty interior.
Theorem 2: Under the functional form restrictions for classes I and II and the
parameter restrictions for class I, there exists an equilibrium. Moreover, Theorem 1
applies, so the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
Proof: See Appendix.12
Figure 1 provides a picture of the equilibrium. The horizontal axis represents the
location space, while the vertical axis is used for the land price density (in dollars per
foot or inch). The horizontal axis is located not at height zero, but at height a~(l-1),
the equilibrium marginal utility of land for the consumer. The firm is located on the
parcel [0,1) while the consumer buys the remainder of the land. The shaded area is
the implicit subsidy from the landlord to the producer, in dollars. The price density is
in fact the minimum of two curves representing marginal willingness to pay for land of
the consumer. The first represents marginal willingness to pay for quantíties of land
starting at the left endpoint of the interval X, while the second is the marginal
willingness to pay for quantities oí land starting at the right endpoint. The minimum
of the two is the symmetric curve p(x).
Next we shall study another class of equilibria for this same model, one that is
motivated by the observation that marginal commuting cost is discontinuous when the
consumer and producer are adjacent. Marginal commuting cost drops írom t to zero
when the consumer and producer touch, thus allowing a discontinuity in land price at
the boundary. We call this class of equilibria class II.
Definition: We say that the parameter restrictions for class 77 hold when the
following conditions are met: 1 ) 3.19, f ( a.[1~(l-2) - 1~(1-1)],
p~ a~(~2) ~- a[1~(~1) f 2.tn((~2)I((ll2)-1)))].
Once again, total land ([) needs to be large enough, while fixed cost (f) must be
small relative to the marginal utility of land (a) and returns to scale (p) large relative
to a. Again, these restrictions represent a set of parameters with nonempty interior.
Theorem 3: Under the functional form restrictions for classes I and II and the
parameter restrictions for class II, there exists an equilibrium. Moreover, Theorem 1
applies, so the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.13
Proof: See Appendix.
Figure 2 provides a picture of the equilibrium. The horizontal axis represents the
location space, while the vertical axis is used for the land price density (in dollars per
toot). The horizontal axis is located not at height zero, but at height a~(~1), the
equilibrium marginal utility of land for the consumer. The firm is located on the
parcel [0,1) while the consumer buys the remainder of the land. The shaded area is
the implicit subsidy from the landlord to the producer, in dollars.
V. Existence of Equilibrium with Two Producers and Many Consumers
This extension of the model is not as easy as it may appear. Consider first a
model with one producer and 2I consumers, and a class I equilibrium. To keep the
model as close as possible to the one in the last section, let us change the technology
to g(a,q) - (i. min (o,[q.l]~I) - f where 1 is the vector of I ones, and let X-[-ifl,lJ.
One way to construct a class I equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3. Again, the
horizontal axis represents location space while the vertical axis gives the price density
for land in dollars per foot. The horizontal axis is located at height a~(t-1) rather
than at zero on the vertical axis. The price density is the same as in the previous
section for the consumer to the right of the firm. We replicate the same density for
the consumer to the left of the firm. This necessitates an alteration of the density on
the firm's parcel, due to the presence of land to the left of the firm that it would
want to buy unless the price were raised (this is justi5ed by the first order condition
tor firm optimization with respect to b). Thus, we take the maximum of these two
price densities. However, land at the extreme lett and extreme right in X is cheapest
under this new density, so the firm would move out to an extreme. To prevent this,14
we must raise the price oí land in the extremes by replicating a shifted price density
once again, and taking the maximum of all price densities. This will violate the first
order conditions for the consumers, which state that the price of the edge of a parcel
closer to the firm must be t higher than the edge further away from the firm (as in
Berliant and Fujita (1992)). This statement dces not apply to the innermost two
consumers, since there is a discontinuity in their marginal commuting cost at zero
distance; there is no such discontinuity for consumers not adjacent to the Grm, so this
statement must apply to them. Moreover, given that the price density on each
consumer parcel is the same, the total cost of each consumer parcel is the same, so
why would any consumer choose to live on a parcel not adjacent to the firm? They
would pay the same total land rent, but incur a higher commuting cost further out,
thus attaining a lower level of utility. Figure 3 dces not represent an equilibrium.
So how can we solve this problem and obtain an equilibrium?
The answer to this question lies in noticing that the problem we have is
overconstrained. We are askíng too much of the rent density, in that it reflects
diíferences in commuting cost among parcels as stated above (essentially the Mills
(1967) - Muth (1969) condition for our model)9, but at the same time, reflects the fact
that the profit function only accounts for the cost and not the location of the parcel,
so the producer will always choose the cost minimizing one. In other words, consumer
optimization requires that rent decreases as distance from a producer increases, to
compensate for commuting costs, while the producer will always find the lowest cost
parcel, located as far as possible from its current spot.
If prices are low on the producer parcel, then consumers will move there to reduce
commuting cost. If prices are low on consumer parcels distant írom the consumers to
compensate for commuting cost, then producers will move there to reduce land cost.
9See, for instance, Fujita (1989, p. 25, equation 2.37) for a nice statement and
explanation.15
Equilibrium is not likely to exist. This is in essence the problem discovered by
Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) in their investigation of the quadratic assignment
problem. io Although their model is different from ours, this kind of problem pertaining
to existence of equilibrium arises in most location models where all agents and
resources are mobile.
We must specify out~f-equilibrium commuting costs properly.
In the pure exchange version of the Alonso model, the location to which consumers
commute, the central business district or CBD, is given and occupies no land.
Commuting cost is given by the "front location" or "front door" (closest point) distance
from the consumer's parcel to the CBD. See Asami, Fupta and Smith (1991) for
elaboration. However, if a producer (or the CBD) occupies space, it is unclear,
especially out of eqwlibrium, where the consumer must commute to. For ínstance, if
the consumer decides to buy a subset oí the parcel used by a producer, clearly a
disequilibrium situation, what is its commuting distance and cost? This must be
specified, even out of equilibrium, in order to verify whether a particular situation
represents an equilibrium or not.
We assume that if a consumer outbids a producer, he or she can no longer work
at that location, since the producer will no longer be there. Consumers and producers
remain price takers; this is simply a specification of disequilibrium commuting costs.
Formally, it amounts to defining commuting distance as




Commuting cost is defined to be Ti(A,B) - t. á(ai,si), analogous to the Alonso model.
We say that commuting cost sntisfies the functional form restriction when this
ioThe quadratic assignment problem is distinct from, but related to, the linear
assignment problem (or one sided matching problem) that is enerally more familiar to
economists. The quadratic assignment model allows ffows oí ~intermediate) goods
between agents, at some cost.16
commuting cost function is used. ii Notice that this commuting cost function is not
upper semicontinuous in consumer location; it can drop discontinuously as the
intersection of consumer and producer parcels tends to the empty set. This is what
necessitates the assumptions of Theorem 1.
Figure 4 illustrates what an equilibrium will look like. The horizontal axis
represents the location space X-[-21,2lJ, while the vertical axis is used for the land
price density (in dollars per foot). The horizontal axis is located not at height zero,
but at height p(2l), the equilibrium margina] utility of land for the consumers located
ïurthest from a Grm. Equilibrium configurations consist of individua] producers
surrounded by commuting consumers. This configuration involves agglomeration around
a producer, essentially a company town. The configuration appears to be unique,
though the equilibrium allocation of mobile good and land is not (as in the Alonso
exchange model). Notice that the ireedom in choosing land price leveLs as distance
from the firm increases allows us to let parcels get cheaper as we move out. This is
necessary in equilibrium in order to compensate for the increased cost of commuting as
distance from the firm increases, for otherwise nobody would live in the hinterlands.
Notice also that we can do this while still making the firm's parcel the cheapest per
unit cost of land, so the firm has no incentive to move. The modification of the
commuting cost function implies that no consumet will encroach on a producer's parcel,
since encroachment means that the consumer must commute to the next closest
producer, requiring a large jump in expenditure on commuting. Thus, the commuting
cost deters consumer encroachment into a firm's parcel, and the low price of land on a
firm's parcel keeps the 5rm there.
i~We intend to attack the Koopmans-Beckmann quadratic assignment problem head on,
using the same modification of out-of-equilibrium transport costs that we have used
here for commuting costs. If an agent wants to cohabit a parcel with another, then it
must go elsewhere for supplies (or more generally, transactions). In closing, we note
that the quadratic programming disease is present in many location models.17
There will be some restrictions on the parameters. The equilibrium will have the
same pattern as equilibrium in the Alonso model, that consumers with higher wages
live further from the firm and buy more land. As in Berliant and Fujita (1992), if
land is a normal good, consumers with higher wages and thus more income will buy
more land and, in any eïficient allocation, consumers purchasing more land must be
located further from the producer, for otherwise we can switch positions of the
consumers, save on commuting costs, and create a Pareto improvement, contradicting
Theorem 1. (Although land is not strictly normal in the example we considered in
section IV, it is weakly normal in the sense that the income derivative of demand for
]and is zero, so the argument applies.) For simplicity, we shall only examine the case
when all consumers are identical.
To make notation simpler, let X- [-21,21f . We focus on the part of the economy
to the right oí 0 in X; the part to the left will be symmetric. There are 4I
consumers. In contrast with the assumptions of the preceding section, we allow a
general utility function. The utility function of every consumer is u(c,s), where
u: IR2} ~ ~t satisfies the following conditions, the first three of which are adapted from
Berliant and Fujita (1992, Assumption 1).
Definition: A utility function u is said to be weU-behaved if it satisfies the
following.
(i) On IR}}, u is twice continuously differentiable, strictly quasi~oncave,
and increasing in both c and s.
(ii) No indifference curve intersecting IR}} cuts an axis, and every
indifference curve intersecting IR}} has the c-axis as an asymptote.
(iii) Lot size (or land) s is a normal good on ~t}}.
(iv) The composite consumption commodity is a normal good on IR}}.
Cobb-Douglas utilities are an example.
Definition: Production satisfies the functional form restriction if g(o,q) - Q.minla
(~~q~ 1) - f.
Definition: The parameter restrictions aze said to be satisfied if the following hold.
I)2,l)2I2 fI,
Q~ max{3f~[4(l f I)], f~(2I) f f[l~(2I) - 1~4](l - I)~[I(l f I)] f(1 - 1~I2)(l - I)t},
f(l - I~2)~[2I(1 f I)) G t. Finally, the marginal rate of substitution of composite good
for land, or the marginal willingness to pay for land, satisfies the following inequality
at a particular (given) allocation. Define
c- min {p - f~(2I) - f[l~(2I) - 1~4](1 - I)~[I(l f I)] -(1 - 1~I2)(I - I)t,
f[l~(2I) - 1~4](l - I)(l - I- Is)~[(1 f I)(I - 1)]}
and s- f(21~I - 1)~[(l f I)(I - 1)t]. The first argument of the min in the expression
for c is positive due to the parameter restriction on Q. The second argument is
positive because s G(1 - I)~I due to the parameter restrictions on I, I and f~t. Hence
c ~ 0. s ~ 0 due to the parameter restriction on 1. Then
au~ as
au~~ ~(i - 3f~[4(l f I)] f(I - 1)t.
(c,s)
For example, a CES utility function will satisfy the last inequality if parameters
are chosen appropriately.
These parameter restrictions imply that the total land available (I) is large relative
to the number of consumers, marginal productivity (p) is large relative to fixed costs
(or that land and the number of consumers are large relative to fixed costs), and that
commuting costs are large relative to fixed costs. The condition on marginal
willingness to pay for land at a particular bundle implies that one consumer's land
consumption cannot become too small relative to another's.
Theorem 4: If utility is well-behaved, production satisfies the functional form
restriction, commuting cost satisfies the functional form restriction, and the parameter
restrictions hold, then there exists an equilibrium. Moreover, if utility is increasing inIs
consumption good and land is a necessity for every consumer,tz then Theorem 1 applies,
so the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
Proof: See Appendix. Figure 4 provides a picture of the equilibrium, and was
explained earlier in this section.
The strategy of the proof is as follows. Guess that the 5rms' parcels are
[-{IfI},-{!-I}] and (!-I,IfI]. Then we fix a wage rate, and then solve the consumer
equilibrium problem on the parcels not occupied by firms, exploiting the results of
Berliant and Fujita (1992) to construct an equilibrium. We set the firm land price
lower than the lowest consumer price, the difference depending only on fixed costs,
total land available, and the number of consumers. '1'hen we set up the zero profit
condition oí the firm in equilibrium, and find a wage rate that solves it. This wage
rate, the implied rent density, the allocation of land, and the allocation of consumption
good form an equilibrium. The hard part of the proof is to show that no consumer
would intrude on a firm's parcel, and vice-versa.
The details of the proof can be found in the appendix.
VI. Conclusions and Extensions
Using some interesting classes of examples, we have examined how land can
reconcile increasing returns and perfect competition in the following sense. In a model
without location, production of a commodity using a technology requiring a fixed cost
followed by constant returns to scale will imply that only one firm producing this good
12Even though it has already been assumed that utility is well-behaved, these
assumptions are applied in order to limit the behavior of the utility function on the
boundary of 0!}.20
will operate in an efficient allocation. However, in a spatial model with commuting
cost, such as the one examined here, there is a trade~ff between returns to scale and
the cost of accessing a firm, thus limiting the extent oí the market served by any
single firm, and therefore allowing multiple active firms in an ef5cient allocation. A
perfectly competitive equilibrium can result in a land price scheme that limits firm size
optimally and provides a subsidy to active firms consistent with efficiency.
The questions we have studied seem important not only in the theory of industrial
organization, in that government intervention in markets for goods produced under an
increasing returns to scale technology may not be justified, but also in the theory of
spatial economics. For example, we can separate results due to imperíect competition
from those due to the presence of location in models. These questions are of central
interest to urban economics and location theory as well. The Spatial Impossibility
Theorem oí Starrett (1978), as interpreted by Fujita (1986), tells us that some
assumption oí neoclassical economics must not hold if we are to generate equilibrium
models of agglomeration. Here we have used increasing returns and perfect
competition, but we are able to generate agglomeration and factory towns in
equilibrium without imperfect competition. Unlike much of the other work on
agglomeration, our equilibrium configurations are first best.
The model can accommodate more firms (and any number of consumers) just by
replicating the example of section V.
Notice that when the number of firms is fixed at the equilibrium number (allowing
entry), the arguments of the previous sections apply. Entry is determined by the zero
profit condition. It seems to us that the assumption of perfect competition in our
model might be justified by competition írom potential entrants rather than by spatial
competition from extant firms, but a formal theory of such a justification is beyond the
scope of this paper. Here we have assumed perfect competition, but have not justified
this assumption formally. The latter should be the subject of future work; the tests of2I
Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1996) for perfect competition should be useful.
One testable implication derived from the model is that the unit land price of a
firm's parcel should be low relative to the unit price of residential land surrounding the
producer. Of course, the hazards involved in testing this hypothesis include the
difficulty in separating the value oí land írom structures as well as zoning laws.
We propose to examine the comparative statics of the model, particularly the
relation between the exogenous parameters (such as returns to scale or commuting cost)
and the number of firms. The number of firms would be endogenous and determined
by the zero profit condition. We hope to generate testable hypotheses in this way.
It is interesting that the arguments used here seem inapplicable to a model with a
continuum of agents who own points rather than parcels of land, since the model relies
on charging different prices for land within a parcel. The use of a Gnite number of
agents contrasts with much of the other literature on spatial economics.
Another issue of interest is the conjecture that, in both this model and the simpler
Alonso exchange model, even though equilibria exist and equilibrium allocations are
Pareto optimal (see Berliant and Fujita (1992) for the exchange case), the core can be
empty. Thus far, we have a quasi-linear example where the emptiness or
non~mptiness of the core depends on endowments. We intend to look at this more
generally, and examine the implications for core convergence.
Our approach to the problem of competitive price support for local monopolies is
applicable whenever units of an input can be identified and priced separately. Land is
one commodity that fits naturally, but this approach is also quite relevant to the
recent minimum wage debate. Here proponents argue that a monopsonist has an
incentive to restrain employment even when the marginal worker has a reservation wage
below marginal productivity. The consequent reduction of the wage rate spreads to the
other workers and the cut in the wage bill (more than) compensates for the foregone
profit opportunity on the marginal worker. This source of inefficiency can be reversedza
by a minimum wage rate, just as monopoly power can be checked by a maximum
product price.
What plagues the effiáency problem of the monopsonist is the law of one price.
The monopsonist refrains from hiring an additional worker, even when marginal revenue
product exceeds cost, out of fear that the new wage spills over to the incumbent
workers. If, however, workers can be identified and rewarded individually, the law of
one price no longer interferes with effiáency and the free market can be relied upon.
Such deviations from the law of one price can be hidden. For example, employers can
offer a bonus on accepting a job (differential moving expenses or other favorable fringe
benefits, for example). The bottom line of our analysis is that input price
discrimination can potentially reconcile the first order condition for pro5t maximization
under perfect competition - price equals marginal cost - with financial viability - total
revenue is at least equal to total cost - when there are increasing returns to scale.23
APPENDIX
Proof oí Theorem 1: Take an equilibrium allocation
[{ci,si,ai}i I I,cL,{z~,b~,a~,q~}~J IJ, and suppose that it is Pareto dominated by another
feasible allocation, [{c',s',a'} I,c ,{z',b'.,o'.,q'}.J J. So u(c',s') ~ u(c.,s.) for all i, i i t i-1 L J J J J J-1 1 i- i i
and cL ) cL, with strict inequality holding for at least one relation. Define A' and
B' analogous to A and B. Since equilibrium utility exceeds u by assumption, apply
the postulate that land is a necessity to obtain that the Pareto dominating allocation
a' fs' a. fs.
has sí ~ 0 for all i. c~ -~ f 1 ~ p(x) dm(x) f T~(A',B') ) ci ~ f 1 1 p(x)
a' a. i i
1 J
dm(x) ~- Ti(A,B) - wi for all i, cí ) cL - f p(x) dm(x) ~- E a., with strict
O ]-1 J
inequality holding for one relation by monotonicity in consumptinn gnnd. Summing
these relations,
I a'fs' I a.fs. 'EI[c; } r i i p(x) dm(x) i- Ti(A~,B')J f cL ~,EI[ci f f 1 ~ p(x) dm(x) -~
Jai ai
I ! J
Ti(A,B)] -F- cL - E wi f f p(x) dm(x) f E~r. (using landlord monotonicity). Now
i-I Q .1-1 J
since [{c~,sí,a~}iI I,cL,{z~,b~,~~,q~}~J I] is feasible, using (3), (4), and (6),
J b'. ~- v' I J
E[g(o~.,4~) - f J J p(x) dm(x)J ~ E wi -~ E~r.. R.earranging,
.1-I
J J b i-1 J-1 J
J
J b'-f- v' I J
E(g(Q'.,q'.) - (' J J p(x) dm(x)] - E wi ~ E a.. The right hand side of this
J-I J J db i-I J-1 J
J
inequality is equilibrium profits. The left hand side of this inequality are profits under
the alternative production plan at equilibrium prices. Since the latter is larger, some
firm must make more pro5ts under the alternative plan than under the equilibrium
plan, contradicting that (9) holds at equilibrium. So the hypothesis is false, and the
equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.24
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let p(x) - aI(1-x-1) for x( 1I2, p(x) - aI(x-1) for x)
1I2, b- U, o- 1, 9- 1, z- p- f, a- 1, s- E-1, w - p- aI(l-2), ~r - A- f-
w- a.ln [(l-1)I(~2)], c- w-[a.2.ln((l-1)I({lI2}-1)) - a.ln((l-1)I(~2))] (which is
non-negative by the assumption on Q), and cL - a.2.ln((l-1)I({lI2}-1)) t ~r. We
claim that this is an equilibrium. Figure 1 provides a sketch of the price density.
First, we verify that this is indeed a ïeasible allocation. To veriíy (3), note that
commuting cost is zero in this allocation, and calculate
c f cL - w-[a.2.ln((~1)I({lI2}-1)) - a.ln((1-1)I(1-2))] f a.2.ln((1-1)I({lI2}-1)) f
(3 - f- w- a.ln((t-1)I(~2)) - p- f- z.
(4) and (5) are obvious. Finally, note that [0,1),[1,Q is indeed a partition of X, so (6)
holds.
R.egarding the equilibrium conditions (7), (8), and (9), (7) can be verified simply
by calculating the total area under the price density, a-2.1n((E-1)I({lI2}-1)), and
adding to it profits ~r.
Problem (1) can be written as the following unconstrained optimization problem by
substituting the budget constraint for c:
afs
max a-ln(s) .f- w- f p(x) dm(x) - t.max(O,a-1)
a,s a
The first order condition with respect to s is p(a f s) - als; this is verified for
our price density at a- 1 and s- l- 1. The Grst order condition with respect to a
is p(a) - p(a f s) - t ií a~ 1, p(a) - p(a f s) E[O,t] if a- 1, p(a) - p(a f s) -
0 if a G 1. This is an interesting and important fact. Notice first that p(a) - p(a f-
s) - t if a- 1, so our equilibrium satisfies the first order condition. Second, this
first order condition is a result of the assumption that closest point distance is all that
matters when computing commuting cost, so discontinuous marginal commuting cost is
the consequence. Total commuting cost is continuous.25
Regarding second order conditions for the consumer, it is rather evident that the
consumer cannot do better by decreasing its parcel size, since the rent curve is less
than or equal to the marginal willingness to pay for land of the consumer. The
consumer cannot do better by increasing its parcel size since for larger parcels, the rent
curve is greater than the marginal willingness to pay for land. Due to the symmetry
of the rent curve, the consumer cannot do better by owning a parcel containing {0}
rather than {1}. Thus, the equilibrium allocation solves (1) for the consumer.
With regard to the firm, notice that optimization will imply that q- v and
optimization problem (2) reduces to:
b~-o
max p. o- f- f p(x) dm(x) - w. Q
b,a b
The first order condition with respect to v is ~i - p(b f o) -~ w- 0, and w was
chosen to satisfy this equality for b - 0 and a- 1. The first order condition with
respect to b is p(b) - p(b f v),13 which can either be ignored since the producer hits
the land boundary at zero, or we can set p(0) - c~~(t-2), altering p on a set of
measure zero.
Turning next to second order conditions for the firm, notice first that if the firm
uses a parcel of any size, it is indifferent about its location, so it will choose one of
the cheapest parcels, and [O,o) is among these. The first order condition with respect
to Q will imply that it will choose a- 1. Beyond this, up to o- 1~2, the marginal
cost of land exceeds the marginal benefit net of labor cost. If the Grm can make
higher profits from expanding the scale of its operations beyond 1, then given the
production function and the price density, it will make. higher profits when b- 0 and
a- l. Profits from such a production plan are given by
!
(10) Q.l - f- w.l - 2. a. f 1~(x-1) dm(x)
!~2
taWhat this means is that the production function is location independent.26
Profits from the equilibrium production plan are given by
!
(11) p- f- w - a. f lI(x-1) dm(x)
l-1
Following some calculations, it can be shown that (11) always exceeds (10) if
[(!-1)I(l-2)] c 2.1n(2) f ln[(~1)I(1-2)] or, as assumed above, l ~ 2.87.
Finally, it is necessary to show that (11) is non-negative, in order to ensure that
the producer will not exit. Again, following some calculations, the assumption that f~
aI[l-2] - a.ln[(!-1)I(6-2)] implies that (11) is always non-negative.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let p(x) - aI(d-x-1) for 1~ x~ 1I2, p(x) - aI(x-1) for
1-1~x~ll2,p(x)-aI(~1)for0(xG l,p(x)-aI(l-1)forl-1 Cx( 1,b-0,o
-1,q-1,z-(3-f,a-1,s-~l,w-p-aI(~2), ~r-Q-f-w-al(l-1),c
- w-[aI(!-1) f a-2-In((l-2)I((lI2)-1))] (which is non-negative by the assumption on
(3), and cL - 2aI(l-1) f a-2.1n((1-2)I({lI2}-1)) f ~r. We claim that this is an
equilibrium. Figure 2 provides a sketch of the price density.
First, we verify that this is indeed a feasible allocation. To verify (3), note that
commuting cost is zero in this allocation, and calculate
c f cL - w-[aI(1-1) f a-2.In((1-2)I((lI2)-1))] f 2aI(1-1) f a.2-ln((~2)I({lI2}-1))
fp-f-w- al(1-1)-p-f-z.
(4) and (5) are obvious. Finally, note that [0,1),[1,1J is indeed a partition of X, so (6)
holds.
Regarding the equilibrium conditions (7), (8), and (9), (7) can be verified simply
by calculating the total area under the price density, 2aI(!-1) f
a.2.ln((l-2)I({II2}-1)), and adding to it profíts a.
As the reader might suspect, the remainder of the prooí that class II is in fact an
equilibrium is quite analogous to the proof for class I, so we shall not bother to repeat
it here. The proof that equilibrium profits are larger than profits using all land27
involves solving a quadratic equation, the largest root of which is approximately 3.19.
Q.E.D.
Proof oí Theorem 4: We begin by fixing w, the wage rate, in [0, ~i]. Apply
Proposition 4 of Berliant and Fujita (1992) to the exchange economy where consumers
have an endowment of consumption good w and land is limited to the interval (lfI,21J,
to obtain an equilibrium price density pw(x), where pw(2~ is uniquely determined (and
is the same for all equilibria). Using the assumption that land is a normal good,
pw(2I) is increasing in w. Using upper hemi~ontinuity of the equilibrium
correspondence oí the exchange economy in w, pw(2l) is continuous in w. We want to
solve
(12) Q- w- í~(2I) - max{pw(21) - f[l~(2I) - 1~4]~(l f I), 0} - 0
on 0~ w~ Q. This will be the zero proGt condition for the firms.
As w tends to zero, pw(2Q tends to zero, so the left hand side of (12) tends to
p- 3fI~[4(1 f I)], which is positive by assumption. Note that at w- p, the leít hand
side is - pQ(2l) - 3fI~[4(l f I)], which is negative. By the intermediate value theorem,
there is a w~` strictly between 0 and p solving the equation. Define p- pw~, and
define si, ci, and ai (i-1,...,I) to be the equilibrium land consumption, composite good
consumption, and parcel front location of consumer i, respectively, derived from the
exchange economy with consumer endowments w~. This is done first on the interval
(lfI,2t), and mirrored on the interval (O,l-I). The allocation on the intervals (-21;[-I)
and (-1fI,0) is defined analogously.
For F-I ~ x~ l~-I, define p(x) - max {p(2Q - f[l~(2I) - 1~4]~(I f I), 0}. The
price density on the firm's parcel ís less than the lowest price on any consumer's
parcel. For 0~ x~ l-I, define p(x) - p(2~x). For -2l ( x C 0, define p(x) - p(-x).
Let bl --~I, b2 - l-I. For j- 1,2 let oj - 2I, qj consists of 2I ones and 2I
zeros with ql f q2 - 1, zj - 2IQ - f, aj - 0. For consumers residing in the interval28
a.fs.
(1fI,2[), ci - w' - t.(ai-l-I) - f~ I p(x) dm(x) ) 0 by construction of the
a.
~
exchange economy allocations. The consumption of other consumers is defined
2l
analogously. cL - f p(x) dm(x) ~ 0.
-2l
We claim that this is an equilibrium. (3) is verified by substitution of the
expressions above for consumption and output (note that the transportation cost terms
cancel). (4), (5), (6) and (7) hold by construction.
Next, we argue that the allocation we have specifïed solves the consumers'
problems (1). By construction of the exchange economy equilibrium, no consumer has
an incentive to relocate within the intervals occupied by the consumers. The land
occupied by producers is less expensive than any land occupied by consumers, but
always requires more transport cost. Consider a consumer parcel (a,afs) containing
part of the land parcel of the firm located at (! - I, 1 f I). We may assume that
a.f- s~2 C l. For if a f s~2 ~ l, then we can flip the consumer parcel symmetrically
about 1, save on commuting cost, and obtain the same quantity of land.
First we consider the case a t s~ I-F I. The idea is to shift the parcel towards
the left. This saves commuting cost. It also saves rent, as long as p(a) ( p(a f s).
By symmetry about l, rent density p(a f s) is also attained at 21 -(a i- s), but a is
to the left of this point, since a f s~2 C l. The next point leftward where rent
density p(a f s) is attained is -2l f(a f s), by symmetry about 0. As long as s~
2l, a is to the right of -2l f(a -F s) and we can shift the parcel towards the left,
saving both commuting cost and rent. If s~ 2l, then since a f sf2 C 1, a c 0; now
we will show that the utility associated with such a big parcel is below the equilibrium
utility level of consumers. We distinguish two sub-cases. Call the rightmost consumer
commuting to the left producer consumer i. In the first case, a~ ai. The encroaching
consumer is spending at least as much on land as any consumer in equilibrium, is29
consuming at least as much land, and is facing the same marginal commuting cost.
Therefore, using strict quasi~oncavity, the marginal willingness to pay of this
encroaching consumer for land to the left of ai is no more than the marginal
willingness to pay of consumer i. So parcels containing points to the left of ai will
yield lower utility. Now consider the second sub~ase, ai G a G 0. By shifting the
parcel to the left, towards the left producer, the quantity of land consumed is the
same„ and the savings in commuting cost (t per unit distance) exceed the additional
rent, p(a) - p(a-Fs). This inequality follows from three facts. First, since we are in
the declining rent region, p(a) G p (ai). Second, p(a f s) ) p(0), the minimum
consumer rent density (recall that a f s~ 1 f I, so a f s is in a consumer's parcel).
Third, p(ai) - p(0) - t, the first order condition of consumer i with respect to a.
Thus, a shift to the left increases utility and we conclude that it suf5ces to consider a
f s C l f I.
Summarizing, and using the fact that very small consumer parcels will only be
located on the left of the firm's parcel to save commuting cost, the only choices that
might be optimizing and yielding higher utility than equilibrium utility for any
consumer are:
for s G 2I, ( l - I, 1- I-~ s)
for 2I ~ s~ i f I f si (or ai ~ a t 1- I), (a, l i- I).
In the first case, by assumption, 1~ 2I2 f I, s G 2I ~ (1 - I)~I ~ si. If the
encroaching consumer has a greater utility level than consumer i, then we reduce his
composite good consumption until the utility levels are the same. By strict
quasi~oncavity, the marginal willingness to pay for land is greater for the encroaching
consumer. By the Grst order conditions the rent density he faces on the right hand
side of his parcel must exceed that of consumer i. This contradicts the construction of
the rent schedule.
In the second case the parcel is (a, 1 t I). If a 1 0, let us compare this parcel30
to an alternative parcel, (a - 2I, l- I), that is the same size but just does not
encroach on the producer. Since a~ 0 and the alternative parcel does not encroach,
the consumer saves at least ( l - I)t in commuting cost by moving to the alternative,
which is adjacent to a producer. An upper bound on the additional cost of land is the
diíference between the maximal and minimal prices of land over a parcel of size 2I,
2I(I-1)t f í(! - I~2)~(1 f I). Notice that the assumption f(l - I~2)~[2I(l f I)] c t
implies f(1 - I~2)~[t(l f I)] ~ 2I. Hence, by assumption, l ~ 2I2 ~ I- 2I2 - I f 2I
~ 2I2 - I f f(l - I~2)~[t(l f I)]. Hence (l - I)t ~ 2It(I - 1) f f(1 - I~2)~(l f I).
Summarizing, the alternative parcel (that dces not encroach on a producer),
(a - 2I, 1- I), is the same size as the original parcel, (a, l f I), and aíter paying for
commuting cost, there is at least as much consumption good remaining. Thus, the
only parcel choices that might be optimizing and yielding higher utility than
equilibrium utility are (a, l f I) where ai ( a( 0.
If ai C a~ 0, then the amount of ~and purchased exceeds 1- I, hence si, and
therefore the marginal willingness to pay for land is less than p(2l). Hence the
consumer must therefore be willing to purchase more land, beyond the point 0, only if
1-I 1-f-I l-I !fI
f p(x) dm(x) f f p(x) dm(x) C f p(2t] dm(x) ~- f p(21) dm(x) or
0 1-I 0 1-I
I-I
(13) f [p(x) - p(21)] dm(x) ( 2If[l~(2I) - 1~4]~(1 -{- I).
0
Next, we contradict this inequality by using our assumptions. Focus on consumer
1, a consumer adjacent to a firm and who consumes the smallest pazcel of land among
all consumers. Now if cl ~ c and sl ~ s, then the 5nal assumption made for this
example, on the marginal rate of substitution, normality of both goods, and equation
(12) imply that the price faced by consumer 1 in equilibrium14 is less than that
t4Notice that in the equilibria we construct, the price function is constant on consumer
1's parcel. The details of the argument in the body of the proof are as follows. As31
consumer's marginal willingness to pay for land, so this could not be part of an
exchange economy equilibrium allocation. In essence, the assumption on the marginal
rate oí substitution ensures that the smallest parcel owned by a consumer in
equilibrium is bounded below in size, so that the additional cost incurred in owning the
land, say, between 0 and l - I is at least t times this length, and thus bounded below.
If this parcel is large enough, then this cost is not offset by the discounted price
available on the consumer parcel (1 - I, l f I). Two possibilities remain: sl ~ s or
cl G c. If sl ~ s, then sl ~ 4í[l~(2I) - 1~4]~[(1 f I)(I - 1)t], so sl(I-1)t ~ 4f[l~(2I) -
1~4]~(I f I). Now s2(I - 2)t ) sl(I - 2)t,...,sl-lt ~ slt. Summing these inequalities
1-I
and using 1 f 2 t... -} I-1 -(I-1)I~2, we obtain f (p(x) - p(2lJ) dm(x) ~
0
s(I-1)It~2 - 2If[l~(2I) - 1~4]~(! ~ I), contradicting inequality (13).
Now consider the remaining case, cl G c and sl ~ s. We consider two sepazate
sub-cases.
If p(2[) G f[l~(2I) - 1~4)~(l f I), then by equation (12), w~ - p- f~(2I). Note
that an upper bound for transport cost on [0,1 - I) is obtained when all si -(l - I)~I:
t(l - I)~I f... {- t(I - 1)(1 - I)~I - t(I - 1)I(! - I)~(2I). Similazly, an upper bound
for rent on [O,l - I) is obtained when all si -(! - I)~I: p(2t)(1 - I) f
(I - 1)t(l - I)~I ~ (I - 1)t(l - I)~I f ... -~ t(! - I)~I - p(2[)(I - I) f (I - I)(1 f
I~2)t(l - I)~I. Subtracting, a lower bound for mean consumption is ~- f~(2I) - p(21)(l
- I)~I -(I - 1)(1 f I)(1 - I)t~I2 ~ p- f~(2I) - f[l~(2I) - 1~4](l - I)~[I(l f I)] -(1 -
1~I2)(1 - I)t ) c by definition of c.
cl i c, the marginal rate of substitution oí land relative to the consumption good is
higher at cl than at c because land is normal. As sl ~ s, the marginal rate of
substitution of land relative to the consumption good is higher at sl than at s because
the consumption good is normal.32
If p(2IJ ~ f[l~(2I) - 1~4]~(1 f I), use the lower bounds íor transport cost and rent
on [o, I- I): tsI ~... ~- t(I - 1)sI - t(I - 1)IsI~2 and p(2Q(! - I) f- (I - 1)tsI -~
... f tsl - p(21) (! - I) f(I - 1)Its1~2, respectively. Then using cl (the
consumption of the first consumer) as a lower bound on the consumption on the
interval [0, l- I), cI -F p(2l)(I - I) f(I - 1)Itsl C Iw' - IcI f I[p(2!) {- (I - 1)t]sl.
Hence cI ) [P(2!)(l - I) - Ip(21)sI]I(I - 1) ~ f[l~(2I) - 1~4](l - I - Is)I[(l f I)(I - 1)]
) c by definition of c.
Hence, in either sub-case, we contradict cl c c.
Thus when transport costs are taken into account, the willingness to pay of a
consumer for any land occupied by a producer falls short of the cost. A consumer
purchasing land used by a producer will have utility lower than a consumer furthest
away from a producer. Since all consumers are at the same utility level in
equilibrium, such a purchase would reduce the utility level of the consumer, and
thereiore will not be made.
With regard to the firms, notice that optimization will imply that the labor input
quantity will be set equal to the land input quantity, and optimization problem (2)
reduces to:
bto
max p. v- f- f p(x) dm(x) - w~. a
b,v b
The first order condition with respect to a is p- w~ - p(b f- o) E[p(2l),p(G}I)].
Marginal revenue net oï labor cost equals the marginal cost of land. Since there is a
discontinuity in the price of land, this net marginal revenue need only be between the
bounds of the discontinuity. w' was chosen to satisfy this condition for bI --1-I, ol
- 2I, b2 - I-I, a2 - 2I. The first order condition with respect to b is p(b) - p(b f
o); this is fulfilled by symmetry. Equilibrium profits are zero by construction of w~;
see equation (12).
Turning next to second order conditions for the Grm, notice first that if the firm33
uses a parcel of any size a, it is indifferent about its location, so it will choose one of
the cheapest parcels. For v~ 2I, these are contained in (bl,blfvl), (b2,b2~a2). The
first order condition with respect to o will imply that it will choose a- 2I. If it
occupies a parcel at an extreme of X and v is slightly larger than 2I, then the cost of
this parcel is higher than the cost of a similarly slight extension of (bl,bl-Fvl) or
(b2,b2fa2). If the firm can make higher profits from expanding the scale of its
operations beyond 2I, then given the production function and the price density, it will
make still higher profits when b--2! and Q- 4l.
Profits from such a production plan are given by
2l
(14) 4pl - f- w`-4l - f p(x) dm(x)
-21
Profits from the equilibrium production plan are zero by construction of w~.
Substituting this into equation (14) by using the deGnition of w' given by equation
(12), aíter some tedious calculations, non-positivity of (14) is equivalent to
~ l-I
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